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Theory of mind (ToM), the ability to reason about other people’s thoughts and beliefs, has
been traditionally studied in behavioral and neuroimaging experiments by comparing perfor-
mance in “false belief” and “false photograph” (control) stories. However, some evidence
suggests that these stories are not matched in difﬁculty, complicating the interpretation
of results. Here, we more fully evaluated the relative difﬁculty of comprehending these
stories and drawing inferences from them. Subjects read false belief and false photograph
stories followed by comprehension questions that probed true (“reality” questions) or false
beliefs (“representation” questions) appropriate to the stories. Stories and comprehension
questions were read and answered, respectively, more slowly in the false photograph than
false belief conditions, indicating their greater difﬁculty. Interestingly, accuracy on repre-
sentation questions for false photograph stories was signiﬁcantly lower than for all other
conditions and correlated positively with participants’ working memory span scores.These
results suggest that drawing representational inferences from false photo stories is particu-
larly difﬁcult and places heavy demands onworkingmemory. Extensive naturalistic practice
withToM reasoning may enable a more ﬂexible and efﬁcient mental representation of false
belief stories, resulting in lower memory load requirements. An important implication of
these results is that the differential modulation of right temporal–parietal junction (RTPJ)
duringToM and “false photo” control conditions may reﬂect the documented negative cor-
relation of RTPJ activity with working memory load rather than a specialized involvement
in ToM processes.
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INTRODUCTION
Cognitive neuroscientists are intensively studying the cognitive
processes and neural systems underlying theory of mind (ToM;
Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003), the ability to understand that other
people have separatemental representations (i.e.,beliefs or desires)
that guide their behavior. Most recent studies (e.g., Saxe and Kan-
wisher, 2003; Mitchell, 2008) have used a “false belief” (FB) task
(Wimmer and Perner, 1983) to measure people’s ability to rea-
son about other people’s beliefs and a“false photograph” (FP) task
(Zaitchik, 1990) as a control story that putatively relies on the same
reasoning processes as the FB task without involving references to
another person’s mental representations1. Another set of studies
has compared FB stories to stories in which the physical cause
1Example of a FB story and comprehension question:“Jenny put her chocolate away
in the cupboard. Then she went outside. Alan moved the chocolate from the cup-
board into the fridge. Half an hour later, Jenny came back inside.” Representation
question: “Jenny expects to ﬁnd her chocolate in the (cupboard/fridge)” Reality
question: “When Jenny returns, she ﬁnds her chocolate in the fridge (true/false).”
Example of a FP story and comprehension question: “A photograph was taken of an
apple hanging on a tree branch. The ﬁlm took half an hour to develop. In the mean-
time, a strong wind blew the apple to the ground.” Representation question: “The
developed photograph shows the apple on the (ground/branch)” Reality question:
“Actually, the apple remained on the tree branch (true/false).”
of an event has to be deciphered (Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher
et al., 2000). All of these tasks have been inherited from the ﬁeld
of developmental psychology, where they have been used to study
normal and abnormal (i.e., autism) development.
Neuroimaging studies that have used the FB and FP mate-
rial published by Saxe and Kanwisher (2003) have consistently
reported that the right temporo-parietal-junction (RTPJ), an area
between the posterior superior temporal sulcus and the inferior
parietal lobule, is activated by FB reasoning (Aichhorn et al., 2009;
Saxe et al., 2009). The RTPJ, however, is also activated by changes
in working memory load (Todd et al., 2005),multisensory conﬂict
(Balslev et al., 2005), attentional functions (Corbetta et al., 2008),
sense of agency (Farrer and Frith, 2002), and out-of-body experi-
ences (Blanke and Arzy, 2005; see Decety and Lamm, 2007 for a
meta-analysis).
This heterogeneous list emphasizes the importance of design-
ing ToM paradigms that control for auxiliary, non-ToM processes
that activate the RTPJ. ToM paradigms involve linguistic analy-
sis, the maintenance, retrieval, and manipulation of information
withinworkingmemory, reasoning, inhibition of competing inter-
pretations, and attention. Comprehension of FB and FP stories
may differentially involve processes such as working memory that
are separate from ToM but modulate RTPJ activity. Therefore, a
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deeper understanding of the cognitive processes recruited by the
FB and FP tasks is necessary before conclusions regarding brain
mechanisms can be drawn.
Theory of mind studies have reported that reaction times are
faster to comprehension questions concerning FB than FP stories
(Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe and Powell, 2006), suggesting
that FB stories are easier to comprehend. This result has been
used to rule out arguments that brain activations for FB stories
could be due to greater difﬁculty or time-on-task. Here, we con-
ﬁrmed differences in difﬁculty using a broader set of measures
and evaluated several factors that might underlie this result. We
checked the cognitive equivalence of FB and FP texts by mea-
suring the time taken to read the story as well as to read and
respond to the comprehension question. We also obtained work-
ing memory span (WMS) scores to check for possible correlations
between WMS and text comprehension. Finally, we conducted
a linguistic analysis of FB and FP texts to test their linguistic
equivalence.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Fifteen participants (nine males; mean age= 25) performed the
experiment in exchange for payment. Participants were native
English speakers between the ages of 18 and 32, were naïve con-
cerning the purpose of the experiment, and gave written consent
following the guidelines set by the Human Studies Committee of
Washington University.
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE
Twenty-four FB and 24 FP stories that have been widely used in
ToM studies2 (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe and Powell, 2006;
Saxe et al., 2006; Mitchell, 2008; Scholz et al., 2009; etc.) were
presented in one experimental block. Four more blocks were con-
ducted with stories that have been used in other ToM studies.
However, because these stories have not been used in many studies
or did not have comprehension questions associated with them,
they were not included in the present analysis. Block order was
counterbalanced and story order was randomized. Each FB and
FP story had two associated comprehension questions, a represen-
tation question (RP) and a reality question (RL). The RP question
probed the character’s mental state in the FB text or the state of
the world portrayed by the photograph in the FP text, while the RL
question probed the actual outcome of the story in the FB text or
the current state of the world (as opposed to when the photograph
was taken) in the FP text. An example of each type of story and
comprehension question is given in footnote 1. Participants saw
both questions in a randomized order. Therefore the experimental
design was 2 (text type: FB vs. FP)× 2 (comprehension question:
RP vs. RL).
2The original set of localizer stories used in the above referenced studies only con-
tains 12 FB and 12 FP stories. A larger set (24 stories/condition) has been developed
by Dr. Saxe and is now being used as a functional localizer in their new investiga-
tions. Since this new set contains most of the stories from the original set (8/12 FB
and 10/12 FP) and has two comprehension questions per story, results are reported
for this set. Results for the original set are reported in footnote 5. A complete list of
all the stories and questions included in the original localizer as well as in the new
localizer can be found in Dr. Saxe’s laboratory website.
A moving window paradigm (Just et al., 1982) was used to
present the text material. Words in the text were hidden behind
letter place-holders. Each button-press revealed a new word and
covered the previous word with place-holders. The reaction time
for a button-press was the estimate of processing time for a word.
This method of presentation allowed participants to use periph-
eral vision to obtain information about the spatial distribution of
the text, as in normal reading, but prevented participants from
rereading previous sections of the text. As a consequence, reading
times were better controlled than under a free reading proce-
dure. Texts were presented on a gray screen with a black font.
After the text was read, a question appeared on a blank screen
with two answers located on the bottom left and right. Partici-
pants selected an answer by pressing a key with the index ﬁnger
located on the matching side. Once a response had been given,
a second question was presented on the screen. Response time
to the comprehension questions was measured from question
onset.
A working memory span (WMS) test (Daneman and Car-
penter, 1980) was run prior to the task in order to estimate
WM capacity for each participant. In this test, sentences were
presented on the screen, one at a time, and participants had
to read each sentence out loud. Following the presentation of
the last sentence, participants recalled the last word of each
sentence. Initially, a ﬁve trial set was presented in which each
trial consisted of two sentences. Therefore, two words had to
be recalled on each trial. If a correct response was given in
three of the ﬁve trials, task difﬁculty was increased by present-
ing three sentences per trial. Again, if a correct response was
given in three of ﬁve trials, task difﬁculty was increased. For
the highest difﬁculty, six sentences were presented on a trial.
Words could be recalled in any order with the restriction that
the word belonging to the last sentence could not be recalled
ﬁrst.
RESULTS
We ﬁrst compared the structure of the FB and FP stories. FB and
FP texts contained a similar number of grammatical sentences per
story (FB= 2.6 and FP= 2.4, t (14)= 1.17, p = 0.247, d= 0.34),
but a different number of clauses per story (that is, the num-
ber of grammatical units consisting of a subject and a predicate)
(FB= 4.3 and FP= 3.5, t (14)= 3.22, p = 0.002, d= 0.93). This
difference indicated that FB and FP stories had non-equivalent
syntactic structures. Syntactic structure is known to inﬂuence
comprehension processes (Friederici and Weissenborn, 2007), as
manifested in end-of-sentence wrap-up effects (Balogh et al.,
1998) that are thought to reﬂect mechanisms for integrating infor-
mation or for checking the completeness of the sentence and its
arguments. As a result, the time taken to read each word of a
sentence in a story is inﬂuenced by the speciﬁc syntactic struc-
ture of the sentence in which it is embedded. Sentences in a text
are individual entities when it comes to comprehension mech-
anisms. Given the lack of equivalence between the grammatical
structure of the sentences in FB and FP stories and the fact
that FB and FP texts had, on average, the same number of sen-
tences per story, we chose sentence reading time rather than story
reading time as the index of linguistic processing/comprehension
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times3. An analysis of sentence reading time showed that FB sto-
ries were read faster than FP stories (t (14)=−6.77, p = 0.001,
d=−0.46).
3In a 30-word-2-sentence story with 10 words in the ﬁrst sentence and 20 words in
the second one, story reading time would be calculated as the addition of the read-
ing time of each of the 30 words. Alternatively, the sentence reading time would be
calculated by adding up the reading time of the ﬁrst sentence’s 10 words, separately
adding up the reading time of the 20 words in the second sentence and then obtain-
ing the mean of both summations. Therefore, the reading time of a single word
is weighted differently depending on the sentence it belongs to and thus provides
more information as to the comprehension processes happening for that sentence.
FIGURE 1 | Response time and accuracy for the comprehension
questions. Bars represent the SE of the mean.
To analyze the comprehension questions, separate ANOVAs [2
(Story Type: FB vs. FP)× 2 (Comprehension Question: RL vs.
RP)] on response times and accuracy were performed. Results
for these analyses are shown in Figure 1. Response times to cor-
rectly answered questions were faster in the FB than FP condition
(F(1,14)= 8.20, p = 0.013, η2p = 0.37). No main effect of Com-
prehension Question or interaction was found (both Fs< 1).
The accuracy analysis showed that FB questions were answered
more accurately than FP questions (F(1,14)= 9.55, p = 0.008,
η2p = 0.41). Moreover, there was a signiﬁcant interaction of Story
Type by Comprehension Question (F(1,14)= 13.24, p = 0.003,
η2p = 0.49). Post hoc LSD tests showed that Representation ques-
tions concerning an FP story were more difﬁcult than questions in
the other three conditions (all ps< 0.030).
We conducted several analyses to check that differences in
response times to questions associated with different story types
were not caused by linguistic features of the questions. As shown
in Table 1, FB and FP questions contained the same number of
sentences and words. Five linguistic indexes showed signiﬁcantly
larger values (i.e., greater difﬁculty) for FB thanFPquestions,while
only two showed the reverse effect. There is no clear evidence in the
literature that the latter two indices aremorepredictive of difﬁculty
than the ﬁve that showed the opposite effect. Overall, these analy-
ses suggest that any effect of the linguistic difﬁculty of the question
on response time would likely have gone in the opposite direction
to the observed effect, which indicated longer response times to
FP than FB questions. Therefore the observed differences between
story types very likely reﬂected processes involved in manipulating
and reconstructing the story to access the information probed by
the question.
We also performed a linguistic analysis to check for differences
between FB and FP stories. Table 1 shows that a clear pattern was
not found. Some indexes indicated that FB stories were more difﬁ-
cult than FP stories,while a similar number pointed in the opposite
direction. Therefore, differences in linguistic difﬁculty between FP
and FB texts do not account for the observed difference in the
sentence comprehension measure.
Alternatively, the main factor driving the results could be the
degree to which the material presented in the story had to be
manipulated in order to answer the comprehension question.
Table 1 | Linguistic indexes for both stories and comprehension questions.
Stories Comprehension questions
FB FP t -test p d FB FP t -test p d
Sentences per text 2.58 2.38 1.17 0.25 0.34 1.00 1.00 – –
Words per sentence 12.81 13.08 −0.37 0.72 −0.11 10.52 10.04 0.91 0.37 0.19
Clauses per sentence 1.76 1.52 2.08 0.04* 0.60 1.77 1.08 6.16 0.00* 1.37
Complex clauses per sentence 1.40 0.98 2.08 0.04* 0.60 1.38 0.17 6.42 0.00* 1.39
Passive clauses per sentence 0.08 0.45 −3.43 0.00* −1.01 0.06 0.04 0.46 0.65 0.09
Relative clauses per sentence 0.18 0.03 2.72 0.01* 0.87 0.46 0.06 4.90 0.00* 1.06
Subjects per clause 0.60 0.82 −3.33 0.00* −0.97 1.52 1.06 5.31 0.00* 1.16
Pronouns per clause 0.18 0.10 1.55 0.13 0.45 0.09 0.00 3.43 0.00* 0.99
Distance subject–verb per clause 0.20 0.40 −1.07 0.29 −0.32 0.13 0.74 −2.66 0.01* −0.59
Adjectives per clause 0.59 1.00 −2.63 0.01* −0.79 0.38 0.75 −3.15 0.00* −0.67
Signiﬁcant differences are marked with an asterisk.
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Responding to some questions may require more manipulation
of the story information in order to extract the facts related to
the question. Since the story was not displayed on the screen at
the time the comprehension question was presented, the accuracy
of subjects’ responses was determined by their ability to manipu-
late the story information in working memory and reconstruct
the state of reality probed by the question. Consequently, the
working memory demands for different types of stories may have
depended on the degree to which the story information had to be
manipulated.
In order to check this possibility, we tested whether subjects’
comprehension indices (reading time, response time, and response
accuracy) correlated with their scores in the WMS task4. If the
results we had found were due to the difference in the amount of
information that needed to be stored and manipulated in order to
correctly answer the question, we would expect to ﬁnd a negative
correlation between WMS and RTs and/or a positive correlation
between WMS and accuracy. WMS did not correlate with reading
time (all ps> 0.400, Figure 2A) but it did correlate with response
time to the comprehension question for all four conditions: FB–
RP r =−0.82, p = 0.001; FB–RL r =−0.67, p = 0.006; FP–RP
r =−0.65, p = 0.009; FP–RL r =−0.73, p = 0.002 (Figure 2B). In
all cases, higher WMS was associated with faster responses. Most
importantly, WMS correlated with accuracy in one of the four
experimental conditions (Figure 2C). Accuracy for representation
questions about false photos (FP–RP), the most difﬁcult question
type5,was higher for those individualswith higherWMS (r = 0.53,
p = 0.040).
4The categorical WMS scores were not discriminative (score bracket 2–2.5 = 13.3%
participants; 3–3.5= 73.3%; and 4–4.5= 13.3%) so we re-scored the tests using
a linear method: responses were scored as percentages of the maximum possible
score (i.e., if participants got a perfect WMS score with a perfect performance they
would have recalled 88 words. We therefore counted the number of words they had
remembered and used the ratio of remembered words over the total as the score).
5The parallel analysis of the original set of stories (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003)
shed very similar results. Story reading time: FB = 3793.52 vs. FP= 4147.66ms,
t (14)=−6.36, p = 0.001, d=−0.45. Comprehension question response time:
FB= 2799.69 vs. FP= 3317.79ms, t (14)=−3.48, p = 0.004, d=−0.67. Compre-
hension question accuracy: FB= 91.40% vs. FP= 85.06%, t (14)= 2.22, p = 0.044,
d= 0.41. ANOVA for response time with 2 (Story Type: FB vs. FP)× 2 (Question
Probe: RP vs. RL; only six stories populate each condition due to the originally
incomplete factorial design): main effect of Story Type (F(1,14)= 12.60, p = 0.003,
η2p = 0.47) where FB stories were faster; main effect of Comprehension Question
(F(1,14)= 4.79, p = 0.046, η2p = 0.26) where Representation questions was faster.
Non-signiﬁcant interaction (F(1,14)= 1.48, p = 0.243, η2p = 0.10) although the
effect of Comprehension Question was numerically smaller for FP than FB (117.5
vs. 414.7ms). ANOVA for accuracy, 2 (Story Type: FB vs. FP)× 2 (Question Probe:
RP vs. RL): main effect of Story Type with responses to FB marginally more accu-
rate (F(1,14)= 4.06, p = 0.064, η2p = 0.23); no effect of Comprehension Question
(F(1,14)= 1.28, p = 0.277, η2p = 0.08); signiﬁcant interaction (F(1,14)= 15.10,
p = 0.002, η2p = 0.52) with post hoc LDS tests showing that FP–RP questions were
clearly more difﬁcult than any other condition (all ps< 0.050). Correlations: non-
signiﬁcant for WMS and sentence reading time: FB sentences r =−0.25, p = 0.373
and FP sentences r =−0.20, p = 0.464; WMS and response time to questions: the
higher the WMS, the faster the question was answered. True for FB stories with RP
probe (r =−0.68, p = 0.006) or RL probe (r =−0.70, p = 0.004) and for FP stories
withRPprobe (r =−0.56,p = 0.028) or RL probe (r =−0.50,p = 0.056);WMS and
response accuracy to questions: FP stories with RP probe tended to be responded
more accurately by those with a higher WMS (r = 0.48, p = 0.073; all other r < 0.22
and ps> 0.400).
FIGURE 2 | Scatter plots forWMS correlations with reading time (A),
response times (B), and response accuracy (C). Signiﬁcant correlations
are marked with an asterisk.
DISCUSSION
The results presented here show that processing of FB and FP sto-
ries is not equivalent, raising concerns that these two conditions
are not suitable for comparison in ToM paradigms. We found
that FB stories were read faster than FP stories and replicated
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition November 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 316 | 4
Callejas et al. TOM and working memory
previous ﬁndings of faster response times to comprehension ques-
tions following FB than FP stories. These response times were
correlated across subjects with WMS scores, indicating the impor-
tance of working memory during the comprehension phase of
the task. The most interesting result, however, was that compre-
hension questions following FP stories were particularly difﬁcult
when they required subjects to manipulate the information pro-
vided by the story in order to reconstruct the original state of
the world, as in the case of representation questions (i.e., in the
FP story presented in footnote 1, the apple hanging on the tree
as shown in the photo as opposed to the apple lying on the
ground after being blown off the tree by the wind). Only in
this condition was comprehension accuracy correlated with WMS
scores, consistent with a particularly heavy involvement of work-
ing memory. Finally, linguistic analyses showed that the increased
difﬁculty and greater working memory requirements of represen-
tation questions following FP than FB stories were not due to the
linguistic features of the questions, consistent with the hypothesis
that they instead arose from the need to reorganize how infor-
mation from FP stories was structured in memory in order to
arrive at a correct response. It is possible that the moving window
paradigm, in which words were presented one at a time, placed
increased demands on working memory. Since these increased
demands applied to both FB and FP stories, however, the use of
this paradigm does not explain the observed difference between
story types. At most, it may have made this difference easier to
measure.
Since the information targeted by representation questions was
presented at the beginning of the text in 87.5% of FP stories, the
greater difﬁculty and largerworkingmemory loads associatedwith
representation questions following FP stories might have reﬂected
a recency effect (Deese and Kaufman, 1957). However, 100% of
FB stories also presented representation informationprior to belief
informationwithout any cost in accuracy, reinforcing the view that
the representation of FB stories was more ﬂexible and less struc-
tured for a particular type of question than the representation of
FP stories.Amore ﬂexible representation of FB informationwould
also explain the faster reading times for this condition.
Developmental studies also suggest that FB and FP stories are
not equivalent. While FB and FP tasks are comparable in difﬁculty
in 3- to 5-year-olds (Zaitchik, 1990; Leekam and Perner, 1991;
Leslie and Thaiss, 1992) no correlation between performance in
the two tasks is found when children’s age is partialed out. There-
fore, the fact that they tend to be similar in difﬁculty in one age
bracket seems more a coincidence than an index of a common
underlying reasoning process (Perner and Leekam, 2008). Perner
and Leekam (2008) also point out the lack of equivalence between
FB and FP tasks since both beliefs and photos are representations
of a reality, but the FB misrepresents its target (in the chocolate
story, the place where the chocolates are currently stored)while the
FP shows its target correctly (in the apple story, the apple hanging
on the tree at the time the photo was taken).
IMPLICATIONS FOR NEUROIMAGING RESEARCH
The results reported here suggest two factors separate from
ToM reasoning that might be responsible for reported activation
differences between FB and FP stories. The ﬁrst is related to
language processing, since we found that FB stories were read
faster than FP stories and the two types of stories were not
matched in their syntactic structure. It is widely agreed that the
right hemisphere plays an important role in language processing
(Jung-Beeman, 2005), speciﬁcally during high level tasks involving
comprehension of metaphors (Mashal et al., 2007) and jokes
(Coulson and Wu, 2005), drawing inferences (Mason and Just,
2004), generating sentence endings (Kircher et al., 2001), and
detecting inconsistencies in stories (Meyer et al., 2000). Inter-
estingly, manipulations of the syntactic structure of sentences
produce activity differences in right posterior STS (Friederici et al.,
2009). Therefore, the RTPJ activations reported in ToM studies
could be related to uncontrolled differences in linguistic features
of the stories. This possibility is supported by the fact that results
originally attributed to differences in mental processes have been
later shown to be due to linguistic features of the experimental
material. Happé et al. (1999) reported that right hemisphere dam-
age (RHD) patients showed difﬁculty with ToM stories but not
with control stories. Tompkins et al. (2008) retained Happé et
al.’s original ToM set but created a new set of control stories that
were better matched in linguistic difﬁculty. They found that RHD
patients were not selectively impaired in ToM, although they were
signiﬁcantly worse overall than age-matched controls. Similarly,
neuroimaging studies that have used material different than the
stories of Saxe and colleagues (e.g., Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003)
have tended to report less clear results (Fletcher et al., 1995; Happé
et al., 1999; Gallagher et al., 2000; Vogeley et al., 2001).
A second factor that is separate from ToM processing and
distinguishes FP and FB conditions is working memory load.
Response times to comprehension questionswere slower following
FP than FB stories and comprehension accuracy was signiﬁcantly
worse for FP stories followed by representation questions than
for the other conditions. WMS scores correlated with the time to
answer comprehension questions in all four conditions and with
the accuracy in answering representation questions following FP
stories, indicating that working memory load is greater under FP
conditions. Importantly, the magnitude of RTPJ deactivation co-
varies with working memory load (Todd et al., 2005), consistent
with other results showing that deactivations become larger as
task difﬁculty increases (McKiernan et al., 2003). The dependence
of RTPJ responses on working memory load was observed in a
non-ToM paradigm, consistent with the view that RTPJ activity is
modulated by a more basic process than ToM that is nonetheless
likely operative during ToM paradigms. Therefore, RTPJ activity
may be more positive in FB than FP conditions because it involves
a lower working memory load.
The absolute polarity of responses in RTPJ is somewhat incon-
sistent across studies. While most papers ﬁnd a relative activation
for FB and a relative deactivation for FP (Saxe and Kanwisher,
2003; Saxe et al., 2006, 2009; Aichhorn et al., 2009; Scholz et al.,
2009), some studies ﬁnd two activations (Perner et al., 2006; Saxe
and Powell, 2006; Kobayashi et al., 2007) or two deactivations
(Mitchell, 2008). The reasons for this inconsistency are unclear,
but may reﬂect the fact that studies typically use a block-like
design that does not differentiate task phases or components such
as text processing, memory maintenance, or the manipulation of
information in order to respond to the comprehension question.
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Different processes within a single trial have been shown to acti-
vate and deactivate the RTPJ, with the polarity of the observed
response at any time point as the sum of the responses to the com-
ponent processes (Shulman et al., 2003). Therefore, it may not be
surprising that the overall polarity of the RTPJ response in ToM
paradigms differs across studies depending on the duration and
timing of the complex mixture of processes involved in FB and
FP conditions. Irrespective of the observed polarity of the overall
response, however, conditions involving higher working memory
loads, such as the FP condition, will produce less positive RTPJ
responses.
Theory of mind studies suggest that RTPJ is a key component
of the network for belief reasoning. According to this proposal, FB
reasoning is carried out by a specialized module (i.e., RTPJ) that
is very effective in reasoning about mental states while the brain
module specialized for other types of reasoning is not as effective.
We suggest instead that the demands on basic processes needed
to successfully perform both conditions are not equivalent and as
a result, the areas modulated by these processes are differentially
activated. Mind reading is a highly valued ability in any social
environment and the amount of practice that we carry out from
early childhood likely far exceeds that for other types of causal rea-
soning. We suggest that this extensive practice allows for a more
ﬂexible mental representation of FB than FP stories in terms of
the frame of reference and for a more straightforward manipula-
tion of information when a reality check is necessary, and results
in the use of fewer resources during processing. Therefore, RTPJ
activity may not be related to mental state reasoning or any type
of reasoning per se, but to a more basic process that is shared to
different extents by FB and FP stories, such as the use of working
memory.
Additional evidence for this proposal can be found in studies
of children. If extensive practice makes us more proﬁcient when
reasoning about mental states, we would expect children to show
no differences in RTPJ activation, since they are not yet experts
and reasoning about FB requires as much resources as reasoning
about FP. As they become more proﬁcient with the former type
of reasoning, differences in RTPJ activity should be more evident.
Saxe et al. (2009) observed this pattern of results in children aged
6–11. While RTPJ was recruited equally for FB and control stories
in younger children, it was only recruited (i.e., RTPJ “activation”)
for mental reasoning in older children. Although the results indi-
cated “activations” for each child in both conditions, the baseline
for this comparison was another condition that had shown a large
deactivation in the group analysis. Therefore, it is quite possible
that if the task data were referenced to a resting baseline, most of
the younger children would actually show a deactivation for both
tasks (indexing a greater difﬁculty in both of them), while older
kids would only show a deactivation for the control stories, which
continued to be difﬁcult, but not for the FB stories.
Taken together, the current results show that comparisons of FB
and FP tasks may not cleanly isolate ToM processes. The behav-
ioral differences between the two types of stories indicate that the
inferential processes necessary to comprehend the text and the dif-
ﬁculty level of these processes are not comparable. While we do
not claim that WM differences are the sole determinant of the lack
of equivalence between FB and FP conditions, our results do show
that these conditions differ in their cognitive processing require-
ments. In conclusion, more attention should be given to the lack
of equivalence between contrasting conditions in ToM paradigms
before drawing general conclusions about the functional role of
brain areas such as the RTPJ.
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